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Introduction
This paper assesses the inflation targeting regime adopted in July 1999 in Brazil, examining the challenges faced in its first three years. The inflation targeting mechanism has shown to be highly important for the macroeconomic stabilization. In spite of different inflationary pressures, the inflation rate has been maintained at a low level in the context of a floating exchange rate regime and inflationary shocks. We stress three important challenges that are also common in other emerging market economies: construction of credibility, change in relative prices, and exchange rate volatility. Moreover, we describe the methodology used to deal with inflationary shocks, and examine some issues involved in the institutional design of inflation targeting, such as the use of core inflation measures, escape clauses, tolerance intervals, establishment of targets, and target horizon.
We show that the inflation expectations of the private sector have not been departing significantly from the targets in the face of inflationary shocks. Other evidence also supports the view that the established inflation targets have worked as an important coordinator of expectations. The estimated reaction function of the Central Bank shows that monetary policy has been reacting strongly to inflationary pressures. In particular, the Central Bank reacts to inflation expectations, providing evidence that monetary policy is conducted on a forward-looking basis. We also find some evidence of change in inflation rate dynamics, basically the reduction in the degree of persistence in inflation. The volatility of output and inflation has also decreased in the inflation targeting period.
We also stress the significant inflationary pressures stemming from the change in relative prices in the economy ("administered or monitored" versus "market" prices) and from the exchange rate volatility in the last years. We estimate the pass-through from exchange rate to inflation rate using a vector autoregression (VAR) estimation, showing the higher pass-through for "administered or monitored" prices.
The Central Bank has developed a methodology to estimate the inflationary effects of change in relative prices, exchange rate depreciation, and inflation inertia. The corresponding results help the conduct of monetary policy as it quantifies the sources of inflation.
Section 2 presents an overview of the first three years of inflation targeting.
Section 3 assesses the different challenges for the inflation targeting regime. Section 4 5 presents the methodology used to deal with shocks, and Section 5 examines some issues involved in the institutional design of inflation targeting. A final section concludes the paper.
Overview of the first three years of inflation targeting
The current inflation targeting regime was adopted in mid-1999, after the floating of the currency in January of the same year. In the first two years, inflation rates were kept on target, having absorbed the initial impact of the exchange rate depreciation in 1999. The successful transition was supported by a considerable fiscal improvement, a shift from the primary surplus of 0.01% of GDP in 1998 GDP in to 3.23% in 1999 GDP in , 3.51% in 2000 GDP in , 3.68% in 2001 Using the structural model of the Central Bank 2 and information concerning the mechanisms for the adjustment of administered prices, it is possible to estimate the contribution for the inflation rate stemming from exchange rate pass-through, inflation inertia from the previous year, and inflation of administered prices and market prices that is not explained by the exchange rate pass-through and the inertia referred to. 2 For an overview of the structural model, see Bogdanski et al. (2000) . Using the aggregate supply curve, which relates the current inflation of market prices to the expected and past headline inflation, output gap, and exchange rate change, we estimate the contributions of the exchange rate pass-through and of the inertia from the previous year for market prices. For administered prices, the estimation depends on the criteria used for the price adjustment of specific items. We can also verify that there has been a gain in terms of variability of the inflation rate, output, and interest rate. and inflation because this result also depends on the magnitude and variability of the shocks that hit the economy. In terms of average, the output growth is higher and the interest rate is lower in the inflation targeting period. The inflation rate is smaller if we compare to the whole period before inflation targeting. In the case of the 1996:01-1999:02 period, the smaller average of the inflation rate is to a large extent a consequence of the pegged exchange rate regime, which turned out to be unsustainable in the medium run.
Challenges in inflation targeting
We stress three important challenges in the first three years of inflation targeting in Brazil: construction of credibility, change in relative prices, and exchange rate volatility.
Constructing credibility
Inflation targeting is, to a large extent, a credibility issue. The Central Bank should act and communicate in a way to convince the market that inflation will be under control. This section shows the estimates of different specifications for Central Bank we present some indications of change in the inflation rate dynamics. We conclude that the Central Bank of Brazil has gained credibility in the conduct of monetary policy. The credibility, however, is still under construction as it takes time to achieve it. Besides, the absence of central bank independence in the legal framework is an obstacle to achieve higher levels of credibility.
The reaction function of the Central Bank
We estimate a reaction function of the Central Bank of Brazil that relates the interest rate to expected inflation and to the output gap, allowing also for some interest rate smoothing:
where i t is interest rate, y t is the output gap, E t π t+j is inflation expectations and π * t+j is the inflation target, both referring to some period in the future, as will be explained below.
3 The sample consists of monthly data between July 1999, when the regime was 
the real, the Selic rate needed to be kept at high levels to prevent an inflation-exchange rate depreciation spiral. 7 Estimations using output growth and the output gap obtained by extraction of a linear trend were also performed. The results were similar and are not reported in this paper. 
. 13 In this case, the p-value is 0.13, but we have to consider the small size of the sample.
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It is interesting to note that such coefficients are around 1.4-1.8 when the dependent variable is the Selic rate, 14 and above 3.6 when the dependent variable is the gap of the Selic rate. This result supports the view that, given a downward trend for interest rates, Copom decisions of leaving the interest rate constant may be interpreted as a tightening of monetary policy. Moreover, in the case of the gap of Selic rate, the coefficients are significantly different from one in all specifications.
14 Favero and Giavazzi (2002) also estimated a similar reaction function using market expectations, and obtained similar results (coefficient equal to 1.78). Silva and Portugal (2002) 
Inflation expectations and the role of the targets
A naive analysis of the inflation targeting regime in Brazil might say that this regime has not been successful in controlling inflation. As Figure 7 shows, since mid-2001, 12-month inflation has been above the upper limit of the tolerance interval.
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Nevertheless, inflation outcomes are not a sufficient statistic for evaluating the performance of the Central Bank. The evolution of inflation expectations, and the role of the target should be more relevant variables for assessing the credibility of the Central Bank. Furthermore, it is necessary to take into account the shocks that hit the economy. 15 There are established targets only for year-end inflation. Therefore it was necessary to impute a target to the other months of the year, which was done by linear interpolation. Since the introduction of the inflation targeting regime in Brazil, the economy has been hit by inflationary shocks, notably by supply and cost-push shocks. As of 2001, shocks such as the energy crisis, the readjustments of administered prices and the exchange rate depreciation have forced the Central Bank to reassess the trade-off between inflation and output variability. Since then and, in a more systematic way, since January 2002, the conduct of monetary policy has been based on accommodating the first-round effects of supply and cost-push shocks. This means monetary policy will allow relative price movements to affect inflation, but will neutralize the second-round effects.
As long as the market understands the objectives of the Central Bank, and its conduct is credible, inflation expectations should be contained and, except for unforeseen new inflationary shocks, inflation should gravitate around the target. Two conditions are necessary to guarantee that inflation expectations will remain controlled.
The first one is clear communication with the market. The market needs to understand why actual inflation was above the target and how monetary policy is being conducted in order to make inflation return to the target. The Central Bank of Brazil communicates with the market via informal speeches or formal documents, such as the minutes of the Copom meetings, which are released one week after the meetings, and the Inflation Report, which is published on a quarterly basis. The second condition for controlling significantly to the inflation targets (coefficient equal to 0.96). Since this result could be a consequence of some correlation between targets and past inflation, we also include the actual 12-month inflation rate in the regression (specifications III and IV). This variable is not statistically significant. Therefore, there are indications that the expectations are forward looking, and the inflation targets play an important role.
In summary, although the actual inflation rate has been above the upper limit of the tolerance interval in 2001 and 2002, the inflation targeting regime has been successful in anchoring expectations. This is a consequence of the gains of credibility that the Central Bank has achieved since the implementation of the inflation targeting regime.
Change in the inflation dynamics
As the inflation targeting regime is supposed to affect the formation of inflation expectations, we can consider the possibility that the backward-looking component in price adjustment has become less important. The share of backward-looking firms could have become smaller and/or firms could give less consideration to past inflation when adjusting prices. This would reduce the degree of persistence in inflation. Following Kuttner and Posen (1999) , we estimate a simple aggregate supply curve for the low inflation period to assess whether the inflation targeting regime was accompanied by some structural change. 16 Using monthly data, we regress the inflation rate (measured by IPCA) on its own lags, the unemployment rate 17 (lagged one period), and the exchange rate change in 12 months (lagged one period). The regression also includes dummy variables that multiply the regressors referred to for the inflation targeting period. The inflation rate and exchange rate change are measured in monthly terms. Table 5 shows three different specifications. In the first, we include only one lag for inflation and do not include the exchange rate change. From the estimated coefficients on the dummy variables, we can conclude that there is a statistically significant change in the constant and in the coefficient on lagged inflation in the inflation targeting period. The autoregressive coefficient falls from 0.74 to 0.15. The 16 It is important to stress that the Central Bank structural model used for inflation forecasting employs quarterly data, and has a different specification, for example, it includes a forward-looking term for inflation, and a term for the output gap instead of the unemployment rate. 17 We use the seasonally adjusted unemployment rate (criterion seven days) produced by IBGE. The results are qualitatively similar if we use the raw data or the unemployment rate estimated according to the criterion of thirty days.
coefficient on lagged unemployment is negative. In all three specifications, there is no statistically significant change in the coefficient on lagged unemployment. 18 However, 18 The estimations reported in Table 5 were conducted without including the terms corresponding to the inflation targeting dummies interacting with the unemployment rate and exchange rate change. since the residuals present serial autocorrelation, we use a second specification that adds another lag for inflation rate. The change in the coefficient of the first lag of the inflation rate is still significant: from 0.81 to 0.23. The sum of the two lags before and after the adoption of inflation targeting is 0.69 and -0.19, respectively. Therefore, we can conclude that there has been a substantial reduction in the degree of inflation persistence after inflation targeting was adopted. This implies a lower output cost to curb inflationary pressures and to reduce average inflation.
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The third specification includes the lagged exchange rate change. percentage points when measured in annual terms. Considering the indirect effects via inflation inertia, the total effect over a year in the inflation reduction is 2.3 percentage points and 1.1 percentage points for the whole sample and for the inflation targeting period, respectively. As before, this result is explained by the different degrees of inflation persistence.
19 Note that, although the constant in the regression is higher in the inflation targeting period, the unconditional expected inflation (up to a constant referring to the natural unemployment rate) is equal to 2.9 and 1.3 for the periods before and after the adoption of inflation targeting using the first specification; and 2.6 and 1.1 employing the second specification. 20 We use the 12-month change; the one, three and six-month changes were not significant. To avoid the presence of autocorrelation in the residuals, we include in the third specification a dummy variable for 2000:07. After a 0.27% monthly average inflation in the first half of 2000, inflation reached 1.6% in July, markedly above market expectations, because of the off-cropping season and a significant rise in administered prices. Including this dummy in the three specifications has no major effect on the estimated coefficients.
22

Change in relative prices
Monetary policy has been facing a significant change in relative prices in the economy that has markedly affected the inflation rate. Since mid-1995, administered prices have increased systematically above market prices. 21 Figure 9 shows the ratio of b) a greater pass-through from exchange rate. There are three basic links: i) the price of oil by-products depends on oil prices denominated in domestic currency; ii) electricity rates are partly linked to exchange rate variations; and iii) the price adjustments settled in the contracts that govern electricity and telephone rates are partly 21 For more details on the behavior of administered prices, see Figueiredo (2002) . presence of a strong backward-looking component implies a higher output cost and inflation rate during periods of disinflation. First, the response of inflation to any inflationary shock is more persistent. Second, since the inflation targets for Brazil are decreasing, it is important that the price adjustments converge to the targets to reduce or avoid output costs. In the presence of stronger backward-looking behavior, however, the adjustment is slower, implying a greater output gap reduction to meet the targets.
Moreover, the telephone, electricity and oil by-products sectors faced some major structural reforms that had some initial implications for the inflation rate. Fixed telephone rates saw two spikes in 1996 and 1997 because the line acquisition fee experienced a sharp fall (not included in the price index), whereas phone rates 
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The effect of the inflation rate on relative prices is broadly known. In this paper, we stress the effect of change in relative prices on the inflation rate. As a measure of the dispersion of relative prices we use the standard deviation of the monthly change of the 52 items that comprise the IPCA. We then test for Granger causality between relative prices and inflation rate. 22 The results are reported in Table 6 , which shows the estimation using one and three lags (selected with Schwarz and Akaike information criteria, respectively) for a sample from 1994:12 to 2002:06. We can reject the null hypothesis that relative prices do not Granger cause the inflation rate. Therefore, change in relative prices conveys information about future inflation. We can also reject the null hypothesis that inflation rate does not Granger cause relative prices. 22 We can reject that they are integrated of order one. 
Exchange rate volatility
Dealing with exchange rate volatility has been one of the main challenges faced by inflation targeting regimes in emerging market economies. Compared to industrialized economies, emerging markets seem to be more sensitive to the effects of financial crisis in other countries. Exchange rate market volatility generates frequent revisions of inflation rate expectations and may result in non-fulfillment of inflation targets. As a general rule, the actions of the central bank should not move the exchange rate to artificial or unsustainable levels. However, the central bank may react to exchange rate movements to curb the resulting inflationary pressures and to reduce the financial impact on dollar denominated assets and liabilities in the balance sheet of firms.
Regarding the financial problems associated with exchange rate volatility, Given the problems associated with exchange rate volatility and the pros of intervention, the Central Bank of Brazil, like other emerging markets economies, including some that also adopt inflation targeting, has actually been implementing a dirty-floating exchange rate policy. 23 Such interventions are made as transparent as possible in order to avoid the concern expressed by Mishkin (2000) that intervention 23 Calvo and Reinhart (2000) discuss the limited empirical evidence of truly free-floating countries.
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may hinder the credibility of monetary policy as the public may realize that stabilizing the exchange rate takes precedence over promoting price stability as a policy objective.
In Brazil, the volatility of the exchange rate has been considerable. We can also use a VAR estimation with monthly data to assess the pass-through and the importance of exchange rate shocks to inflation rate variability. We use two specifications. Both include output, spread of EMBI+ (Emerging Markets Bond Index Plus) over Treasury bonds, 25 exchange rate (monthly average), and interest rate (monthly average). Output is measured by industrial production, seasonally adjusted data, produced by IBGE. The inclusion of EMBI+ was necessary because it is a good indicator for financial crises, both foreign (Mexico, Asia, Russia, Argentina) and domestic (beginning of 1999), which have a significant impact on interest rates. The interest rate is the Selic overnight rate, the basic interest rate in the economy, controlled by the Central Bank. In the first specification, we use administered and market prices as variables, whereas in the second we use the consumer price index IPCA instead. We estimate the model in levels, that is, using I(1) and I(0) regressors instead of using the 27 error correction representation. 26 The estimation is consistent and captures possible existing cointegration relationships (Sims, Stock, and Watson, 1990; Watson, 1994) .
The variables used are the log-levels of output, administered prices, market prices, IPCA and exchange rate, and the levels of EMBI+ spread and interest rate. We use a
Cholesky decomposition with the following order in the first specification: output, administered prices, market prices, EMBI+, exchange rate, and interest rate. In the second specification, the consumer price index substitutes for administered and market prices. Since the financial variables react more rapidly to shocks, we include them after output and price. We also estimate using interest rate before exchange rate. The results, even numerically, are very similar. We use two samples. The first one includes the whole period of the Real Plan, from September 1994 through June 2002. 27 The second sample starts with the implementation of the inflation targeting regime (July 1999) in order to try to capture some specificities of the recent period. However, since the sample is very short, the estimation does not generate statistically significant results. Figure 11 shows the impulse responses to a one standard deviation of exchange rate shock, using the whole sample. It presents the point estimates and the two-standarderror bands, which were estimated using a Monte Carlo experiment with 1000 draws.
The values shown are percentage points. The lag length of the VAR estimations was chosen according to the Schwarz criterion, but we test for the presence of serial correlation of residuals, and increase the number of lags when necessary to obtain no serial correlated residuals. 28 The responses of administered and market prices are positive and statistically significant. The increase in administered prices is greater than that of market prices (note that the scales in the graphs are different). The exchange rate increases initially 2.6%, reaching a total of 4.3% in the second month, and starts decreasing after that. The rise of both administered prices and market prices reaches a maximum in the eighth month. The values of the pass-through are presented in Table 7 .
We estimate the pass-through as the ratio of the price increase in a 12-month horizon to the value of the exchange rate shock. If we consider the value of the exchange rate shock in the first month, the pass-through is 19.7% for the administered prices, and 26 According to augmented Dickey-Fuller unit root tests, we can accept the presence of a unit root for the log-levels of IPCA, administered prices, market prices, exchange rate, interest rate, and for the level of EMBI+ spread. We reject the presence of a unit root for the monthly change of those variables, and for the level of interest rate. 27 July and August 1994 were excluded because the price indexes were still "contaminated" by the previous high inflation period. In this case, the start of the sample is adjusted according to the number of lags used. 28 We have used four lags for both specifications.
7.8% for the market prices. Considering the value of the exchange rate shock in the second month, the pass-through is 12.1% and 4.8%, respectively. The pass-through for the administered prices is 2.5 higher than that for market prices. Figure 12 shows the responses in the case of the specification that includes the IPCA instead of administered and market prices. 29 The pass-through to the IPCA was estimated at 14.1% and 8.4%, considering the first and second month shock, respectively. We also consider a variance decomposition analysis, which gives the percentage of the forecast error variance of a variable that can be attributed to a shock to a specific variable. The influence of exchange rate shocks on administered prices is greater than on market prices. Considering a 12-month horizon, shocks to the exchange rate explain 24.9% of the forecast error variance of administered prices, and 16.3% of that of market prices. Using the specification with the IPCA, the value is 23.0%.
29 The response of the price level stabilizes if we consider a 24-month horizon. Response of ER to ER
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Since the inflation targeting regime may have represented a structural change in the relationships, and the exchange rate regime is different from most of the previous period, we estimate a VAR model for the first three years of inflation targeting (1999:07-2002:06) . However, the sample size is too short, and the response of administered and market prices is positive, but not statistically significant using a twostandard-error band (they are significant in the first months if we use a one-standarderror band). To compare with the previous estimation, however, we show the point estimates in Table 7 . They are very similar to those found for the whole sample. 30 These results using a VAR model are not in line with those in Muinhos (2001) , which shows a structural break in the pass-through coefficient when the exchange rate regime changed.
The estimations are conducted using a linear and a non-linear Phillips curve. The passthrough in the same quarter of the exchange rate change fell from more than 50% to less than 10%.
In terms of variance decomposition, exchange rate shocks explain 23.4% and 40.2% of the forecast error variance of administered and market prices, respectively, in a 12-month horizon (the first value is almost statistically significant, and the second is significant). Therefore, in this estimation, the contribution of exchange rate shocks was 30 We have used two lags in both specifications. With the IPCA and three lags, however, the values are smaller for the pass-through: 9.6% and 4.8%. greater for market prices than for the administered. For the case of the IPCA, the exchange rate shocks explain 32.8% of the forecast error variance of prices.
Therefore, exchange rate volatility is an important source of inflation variability.
The design of the inflation targeting framework has to take into account this issue to avoid that a possible non-fulfillment of inflation targets as a result of exchange rate volatility decreasing the credibility of the central bank.
Methodology for calculating inflation inertia and the effects of the shock to administered prices
The interest rate should react to inflationary shocks. However, monetary policymakers have to consider several issues concerning the shocks: their nature (demand or supply shocks), degree of persistence (temporary or permanent), size and their inflationary impact. In the case of supply shocks, there is a trade-off between output gap and inflation. 31 The optimal response of the interest rate depends on the degree of inflation aversion, on the response of inflation to the output gap, and on the degree of persistence of the shock. Monetary policy should react less, and we can even consider that it may not react, when supply shocks are temporary or have a small size.
Likewise, the greater the time horizon of the inflation target, the lower the reaction of the central bank.
As discussed in previous sections, change in relative prices has been one of the main challenges faced by the Central Bank of Brazil. Since the implementation of the Real Plan, in July 1994, administered price inflation has been well above market price inflation. As long as there is some downward rigidity in prices, change in relative prices is usually translated into higher inflation. However, monetary policy should be oriented towards eliminating only the secondary effect of supply shocks on the inflation rate while preserving the initial realignment of relative prices. Therefore, the efforts of the Central Bank to quantify the first-order inflationary impact of administered price inflation have become particularly important, since it helps to implement monetary policy in a flexible manner and without losing sight of the larger objective of achieving the inflation targets set by the National Monetary Council.
31 See Clarida, Galí, and Gertler (1999) .
The first-order inflationary impact of the shock to administered items is defined as the variation in administered prices exceeding the target for the inflation rate, weighted by the share of administered prices in the IPCA and excluding the effects of the inflation inertia from the previous year and of variations in the exchange rate. The effect of the inflation inertia is excluded because inflation propagation mechanisms should be neutralized by monetary policy, which has to consider the appropriate period.
As a rule of thumb, the Central Bank considers 18 months an adequate period to offset the inertial effects of higher inflation. The exchange rate variation is excluded because this variable is affected by monetary policy and could reflect demand shocks. Therefore, in defining the shock to administered prices, only the component of relative price change that has no relation to activities of the Central Bank of Brazil is preserved as a first-order supply shock.
This section summarizes the methodology currently used to separate the effect, via inertia, of previous-year inflation on current-year inflation, and the inflationary impact brought about by the shock to administered prices. 32 In this summary, it is assumed that the inertial effects and the pass-through from exchange rate to prices are the same for all goods in the economy.
Calculating the primary effect of the shock to administered prices
The first-order inflationary impact or primary effect of readjustments in administered prices is calculated by the difference between administered price inflation and the inflation target for the year (weighted by the influence of administered prices on the IPCA), excluding the effects of inflation inertia and of the exchange rate variation on administered prices:
where ShA = first-order inflationary impact of administered prices; π adm = administered price inflation; π * = target for the inflation;
ω adm = weight of administered prices in the IPCA;
32 See Freitas, Minella, and Riella (2002) for a more detailed description of the methodology.
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IA = effect of the inertia in the previous year on the evolution of administered prices; CaA = effect of the exchange rate variation on the evolution of administered prices.
The following subsection shows the calculation of the IA and CaA components.
Calculating the effect of inflation inertia and exchange rate pass-through on administered prices
The model adopted by the Central Bank of Brazil assumes that the inflation in a given quarter depends on the inflation registered in the previous quarter, which in turn depends on the inflation in the quarter before, and so on. The inertia inherited in a given year results from the inflation registered in the last quarter of the previous year, and its calculation is based on the inflation that exceeded the target. The inertia inherited from the last quarter of the previous year impacts the inflation in each quarter of the current year according to the following formula: 
where Π represents the productory symbol. In this paper, we assume, for simplicity, that I = IA, that is, the inertia estimated for administered prices is the same as that for market prices.
The formula below shows how to measure the influence of exchange rate variation on the primary impact of the shock to administered prices:
where CaC t = effect of the exchange rate variation on the price adjustment of utility C in month t;
(e t-1 -e t-k ) = exchange rate variation accumulated from t-k to t. The value of k depends on the specific good one is analyzing. There are utilities whose price adjustments depend on the 12-month exchange rate variation, while for other goods, such as gasoline, price adjustment is based on the evolution of the exchange rate in the previous month. As stated before, for simplicity, we assume all goods follow the same rule; 2 α = pass-through of the exchange rate variation to prices; ω = weight of the specific good in the IPCA. In this paper, it corresponds to administered prices as a whole. Table 8 shows a hypothetical example of how the primary effect of the shock to administered prices and the inertia inherited from the previous year could be useful in a monetary policy decision. This example was built assuming that the target for inflation is 4% and expected inflation is 5%.
An example
According to this example, inflation is expected to be 1 percentage point above the target for that year. Cookbook recipe would suggest that Copom raise interest rate 33 .
However, Copom should adjust the target, adding the impact of inertia to be tolerated in that year (line c) and the primary effect of the shock to administered prices (line h).
Observe that Copom interprets as a shock not the whole increase in administered prices, but only the increase that is not explained by inertia and the exchange rate change.
The target adjusted by the above-mentioned effects rises to 4.9%, which is close to the inflation forecast of 5%. Hence, in this case, the optimal policy would be to leave interest rates unchanged. There are, however, other points to be taken into consideration. The most important one is the trade-off between credibility and flexibility that arises when the forecast for inflation approaches the upper limit of the tolerance interval, while the forecast excluding the inertia and administered price shocks remains around the target. There is no clear answer for solving this trade-off, but, as a general guideline, the Central Bank should be more flexible the higher its credibility, the better it can communicate with the market, and the stronger the output loss involved if inflation is brought back to target. In this sense, the bands should be considered mainly as checkpoints, with the Central Bank explaining clearly the reasons for the nonfulfillment of the targets. Table 8 35
Institutional design of inflation targeting
The inflation targeting framework has to be designed in such way that the We stress four issues involved in the institutional design of inflation targeting: i) the choice of price index (core versus headline inflation), ii) the inclusion or not of escape clauses, iii) the size of the tolerance intervals (bands), and iv) the horizon and criteria used for the targets. 34 Besides these issues, it is important to note the current gap in the Brazilian institutional framework represented by the absence of central bank independence. Central bank independence has been implemented in several countries, and is an important element for consolidating a policy oriented towards price stability.
"To core or not to core"
The use of some measure of core inflation has been justified on the grounds that a measure of inflation that is less sensitive to temporary price movements and more reflective of the long-term trend is necessary. Monetary policy should not target a variable that is subject to temporary movements. A core inflation measure is also justified based on the argument that a measure of inflation that is less sensitive to supply shocks, such as oil prices shocks, is necessary.
There are different measures of core inflation. The most common methodologies are the exclusion method, and the trimmed mean method. The first usually excludes some items such as food, oil by-products, and other energy prices because these prices present high seasonality and are often subject to supply shocks. The symmetric trimmed mean core excludes the items presenting the higher and the lowest change in the period.
The items are ordered according to their change. The items excluded are those whose accumulated weight from the top of the list reaches some threshold, say 20% or 30%, and those following the same criterion from the bottom of the list.
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In Brazil, the change in relative prices has motivated the discussion of the adoption of a core inflation measure, in particular, a measure that would exclude administered prices. Nowadays, only a few countries target a core inflation measure, for example Canada and Thailand, which use core by exclusion. We do not include in this group countries such as the United Kingdom and South Africa, which use an inflation measure that excludes only mortgage interest rates. In this case, the motivation for the adoption of an exclusion index is different: increases in interest rates, via mortgage rates, positively affect the headline inflation rate. Actually, the international experience has pointed to the use of headline indices: Australia, New Zealand, and the Czech
Republic abandoned the use of core inflation measures in 1998, 1999, and 2002, respectively. Other countries, such as Colombia, Iceland, Israel, Mexico, Peru, Poland, Sweden, and Switzerland also use headline inflation (Ferreira and Petrassi, 2002) .
The main argument against the use of core inflation is that it is less representative of the loss of the purchasing power of money. Agents are concerned about the whole basket of consumption. In the Brazilian case, exclusion of the administered items would imply leaving out more than 30% of the representative consumption basket. In this sense, private agents may question a monetary policy that is not concerned about the overall consumer price index.
Furthermore, in the Brazilian case, on some occasions during the 1970s and 1980s, the government excluded some items from the headline index on an ad hoc basis in order to reduce the official inflation rate, or even changed the official index. As a result, the agents in Brazil tend to be reluctant to accept an index that excludes some items because it reminds them of these changes in the past.
The adoption of a trimmed mean core in turn would imply a great loss in terms of communicability. The basket that comprises the index is not known a priori: it depends on the evolution of prices. Furthermore, the choice of the threshold is not 35 The sample of the variations of the inflation rate components is ordered {x 1 , ... , x n } with their respective weights {w 1 , ... , w n }. The symmetric trimmed mean is obtained from
, where α is the threshold,
, I α is the set of the components to be considered in the computation of the trimmed mean with α%, and W i is the accumulated weight up to i-th component (Figueiredo, 2001) .
trivial, and is necessary to smooth some prices whose adjustments take place only from time to time. 36 The Central Bank of Brazil uses a 20% symmetric trimmed mean core that includes the smoothing of eight items. 37 Figure 13 presents the monthly headline (IPCA) and core inflation rates. The core measure is considerably less volatile than the headline. The standard deviation of core inflation is 0.28 and that of headline inflation 0.42 (sample 1996:01-2002:08) .
Nevertheless, the trimmed mean core has been shown to play an important role as predictor of inflation trend. Table 9 shows Granger causality tests between core inflation and headline inflation (IPCA). 38 We find that core inflation Granger causes headline inflation, that is, core inflation conveys information about future inflation (beyond that contained in past inflation), and inflation rate does not Granger cause core inflation. Therefore, core inflation can be used as a useful source of information about future inflation. 36 The discontinuous adjustments tend to be larger than the average. Therefore, in the absence of smoothing, these items would be systematically excluded. 37 See Figueiredo (2001) for an evaluation of different core measures for Brazil. 38 See also Figueiredo and Staub (2002) . Figueiredo (2001) found that the core measure has the "attractor" property as well. 
Escape clauses
Since the inflation rate is subject to several factors that are beyond the control of monetary policy, the success of the conduct of monetary policy should not be judged exclusively in terms of the fulfillment or not of the inflation targets. Under some circumstances, such as significant supply shocks, the central bank cannot avoid the inflationary impact of the shock because of the presence of lags in the effects of monetary policy or should not avoid it because of the associated output costs.
In the case of escape clauses included in the inflation targeting framework, the circumstances under which the central bank can justify the non-fulfillment of the targets are set in advance. The inflation target design in New Zealand, South Africa, the Czech Republic and Switzerland includes escape clauses (Ferreira and Petrassi, 2002) . In New Zealand, they can be invoked in the case of unpredictable events that can affect the inflation rate, such as natural disasters, and change in commodity prices and indirect tax rates. In South Africa, escape clauses include significant change in terms of trade, natural disasters, and interruption of external capital flows. Besides significant changes in international prices and agricultural production, natural disasters, and change in indirect tax rates, escape clauses in the Czech Republic comprise changes in regulated prices that affect headline inflation by more than 1-1.5 percentage points, and large changes in the exchange rate not related to domestic monetary policy. In Switzerland, escape clauses refer to change in the exchange rate and the prices of some items such as oil and imported goods.
There is clearly a trade-off in the adoption of escape clauses in the framework.
Their inclusion allows a better assessment of the conduct of the central bank, and may In the Brazilian case, since the regime is still relatively new, and its credibility is still under construction, the adoption of escape clauses could negatively affect its credibility. Furthermore, the tolerance intervals should be enough to accommodate most of the shocks that the economy is subject to.
Tolerance intervals (bands)
The limits of the forecasting models, the possibility of unexpected shocks hitting The size of the bands should be large enough to allow the inflation rate to be within them in most circumstances, but at the same time they are not supposed to be too large to avoid a lenient conduct of monetary policy. The size of the bands has to be established according to the importance of the three factors mentioned above: it depends on the limits of the forecasting models, the frequency and magnitude of the shocks that the economy is subject to, and the lag length of the effects of monetary policy. In the Brazilian economy, it is clear that the first two factors lead to a larger band size. First, other economies can use models estimated using a large sample because they have a much longer history of stability, and in many cases the inflation targeting regime has been adopted over a longer period. 39 As a result, the forecast model can be estimated more precisely. In Brazil, the dynamics of inflation in the high-inflation period are markedly different from those in the low-inflation period. As a consequence, most of the estimations that model inflation have to start after June 1994. Moreover, with just three years of inflation targeting, possible structural breaks in the relationships are not easily found. Second, the Brazilian economy has been hit by frequent and large shocks.
Most of them are related to its position as an emerging market economy -high volatility of country risk premium and of the exchange rate -and to some structural transformations that led to a change in relative prices. The volatility of the inflation rate and exchange rate in Brazil is still one of the highest in inflation targeting economies.
As we saw in previous sections, the exchange rate depreciation accounted for 
Establishment of targets and target horizon
The inflation targets have to be set taking into account both the long-term goal of price stability and the conditions for their achievement. If the actual or expected inflation rate is above the long-term goal, the targets have to be set in such way that the inflation rate converges to it. However, it is necessary to take into consideration the associated output costs, and some country specificities that may lead to a medium-term inflation rate goal above a long-term one.
The length of the target horizon has also implications for the magnitude of the response of monetary policy to shocks. The longer the target horizon, the smaller the effects of current shocks in expected inflation for the target horizon. As a consequence, monetary policy tends to respond less to shocks.
The targets in Brazil are set in June by the CMN for the end of the calendar year two years ahead. The initial targets were established taking into account the domestic currency depreciation of the beginning of 1999, and aiming at reducing the inflation rate to low levels. In June 1999, the targets were established at 8%, 6%, and 4% for 1999, 
Conclusions
The inflation targeting regime in Brazil is relatively new, but has shown to be important in achieving low inflation rate levels even in a context of large shocks. The presence of a central bank committed to achieving preannounced inflation targets has worked as an important coordinator of expectations and generated a more stable inflation scenario. The pursuit of the goal, and the significant increase in the transparency that has marked the conduct of the monetary policy -including the release of the minutes of Copom meetings seven days after the event and of the quarterly Inflation Report -have helped develop of the awareness of the importance of the price stability commitment.
In this period, the regime has faced many challenges, including the construction of credibility -still under way -the change in relative prices, and the exchange rate volatility. Dealing with them has required a large effort of the Central Bank, which itself has also learned substantially and improved the system. The Central Bank has reacted strongly to inflation expectations, consistent with the inflation targeting framework. 
